Personality and an internal enemy: understanding the popularity of Álvaro Uribe, 2002-2010 by García Sánchez, Miguel & Rodríguez Raga, Juan Carlos
PERSONALITY AND AN INTERNAL ENEMY:  
UNDERSTANDING THE POPULARITY OF  
ÁLVARO URIBE, 2002-20101
Miguel García-Sánchez2 and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga3
Abstract
During two terms in office, Álvaro Uribe enjoyed very high approv-
al ratings. This deviates from the typical approval patterns exhib-
ited by most executives in the region and from prior Colombian 
presidents. In this paper we give elements to understand what ex-
plains Uribe’s eight-year honeymoon. Here we argue that Uribe’s 
popularity was the interplay of three factors: A ruling style that al-
lowed him to build an affective link with citizens. Uribe’s ability to 
create a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere regarding the internal 
armed conflict. And a booming economy. Using regression mod-
els based on cross-national and survey data results indicate that: 
Uribe exhibited high approval ratings because he was part of a 
group of Latin American executives who developed a government 
style based on an emotional link with people, and that those citi-
zens who saw the internal conflict as the main problem in Colom-
bia and were more exposed to Uribe’s messages about the insur-
gent threat were more likely to support him. 
Resumen
Durante sus dos períodos como presidente de Colombia, Álvaro 
Uribe disfrutó de altísimos niveles de aprobación. Esto claramente 
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se desvía del patrón de aprobación de la mayor parte de los pre-
sidentes de la región y de sus predecesores nacionales. En este 
artículo ofrecemos elementos para entender por qué Uribe disfru-
tó de una luna de miel de ocho años. En este artículo argumenta-
mos que la popularidad de Uribe puede entenderse a partir de una 
combinación de tres factores: Un estilo de gobierno que le permi-
tió establecer un vínculo emocional con los ciudadanos. La habi-
lidad para crear una atmosfera de “rally alrededor de la bandera” 
(patriotismo) en relación al conflicto armado interno. Y una eco-
nomía en expansión. A partir de modelos de regresión basados en 
datos de nivel nacional y de encuestas, nuestros resultados indi-
can que Uribe disfrutó altos niveles de aprobación debido a que 
formó parte de un grupo de presidentes latinoamericanos que de-
sarrollaron un lazo emocional con los ciudadanos, y que fue más 
probable que aquellas personas que veían el conflicto interno co-
mo el principal problema del país y estaban más expuestas a los 
mensajes del presidente sobre la insurgencia expresaran altos ni-
veles de apoyo hacia este.
Introduction
The election, in 2002, of Álvaro Uribe as president of Co-
lombia represented a major change in Colombian politics. 
His victory and later his administration contributed to the 
debilitation of traditional parties and to the reshuffling of 
the existing party system. His counterinsurgency policy 
weakened guerrillas like no other administration before. 
However, mounting pressures from the president to erad-
icate left-wing guerilla groups at all cost produced out-
rageous human rights violations. For instance, army units 
executed thousands of civilians falsely labeled as guer-
rilla combatants. Uribe’s administration was also marked 
by corruption scandals and attempts to change the bal-
ance of power. In fact, he managed to amend the Constitu-
tion to ensure a second term (2006-2010) and would have 
achieved a second reelection had the Constitutional Court 
not struck down his attempt to further amend the consti-
tution. Despite such heterogeneous balance in terms of 
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government performance, unlike his predecessors and his 
successor, Uribe enjoyed an exceptionally strong popular 
support.
After a failed peace process between the Pastrana ad-
ministration (1998-2002) and the FARC, a peak in violence 
and insecurity, and a public mood characterized by feelings 
of uncertainty, Álvaro Uribe’s discourse of recovering order, 
security, and prosperity, and his critique to the political es-
tablishment gained momentum among the public (Hoskin, 
Macías, & García-Sánchez, 2003). Uribe’s closest competi-
tor, Horacio Serpa, the candidate formally from the Liberal 
party, represented in the eyes of voters all the sins of the 
traditional party leaders.On top of that, Serpa’s campaign 
did not manage to articulate a clear message and insist-
ed on a negotiated peace with armed groups at a moment 
when voters wanted a shift in the approach to the guer-
rilla problem, from negotiation to military confrontation. In 
May 2002, Uribe was elected president of Colombia in the 
first round of the presidential election. He obtained 52.9% 
of the vote, while Serpa received only 31.7% of the votes 
(Hoskin, Macías, & García-Sánchez, 2003). Uribe was the 
first dissident of the Liberal party to win the presidency.4 
Unlike previous dissidents, Uribe was able to win the elec-
tion by attracting many Liberal and almost all Conservative 
voters, as well as the support from several politicians who 
approached Uribe as his candidacy gained momentum and 
Serpa lost ground among the electorate (Murillo & Fernán-
dez, 2003).
Uribe’s first term was a clear success in terms of secu-
rity and economic performance. He managed to dismantle 
the paramilitary bands through a negotiated deal, and his 
counterinsurgent strategy (Seguridad Democrática) started 
to weaken the guerrilla forces. The economy grew faster 
4 In 1946 and 1982 the Liberal party lost the presidential bid because candi-
dates Jorge Eliecer Gaitán and Luis Carlos Galán, respectively, ran dissident 
Liberal campaigns that split the Liberal electorate in two, opening the door for 
a Conservative party victory.
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than 5 percent and oil prices soared. But beyond the num-
bers, his leadership style helped him build a close relation-
ship with the public. An amendment enacted by Congress 
in 2005 lifted the constitutional ban on reelection, thus al-
lowing Uribe to run for a second term. By the 2006 election 
the entire political establishment sided with Uribe. His only 
opposition came from the left and a handful of Liberal poli-
ticians. In May 2006 Uribe won reelection with 62.3% of 
the first-round vote.  His main opponent, Carlos Gaviria, the 
candidate of a leftist coalition, was supported by just 22% 
of the electorate.
During his eight years in office, Álvaro Uribe’s approval 
ratings deviated from the typical pattern exhibited by most 
executives in the region and from the rates obtained by oth-
er prior Colombian presidents (Carlin & Martínez-Gallardo, 
2018). Research has shown that the executive experienc-
es a short period in which approval increases (honeymoon) 
and then these ratings tend to decline (Carlin & Martínez-
Gallardo, 2018); that was clearly not the case of Uribe. 
He started his first term in 2002 with very high approval 
numbers that remained high throughout his two terms. As 
shown in Figure 1, presidential approval scores in Colom-
bia moved from around 20% at the end of the Pastrana ad-
ministration to close to 70% at the beginning of Uribe’s first 
term. Such scores remained above 60% over his two ad-
ministrations, reaching in 2008 a top level of 80%. What 
explains this eight-year honeymoon? 
Studies on wealthy Western democracies have dem-
onstrated that three main forces drive presidential approv-
al: First, the honeymoon effect, that is, an initial phase of 
high approval rates that tend to decline as the presiden-
tial term elapses. Second, economic factors affect presiden-
tial approval; in particular economic crises and poor eval-
uations of the national economy result in lower approval 
rates. Third, international crises tend to have the opposite 
effect, as they activate a sense of patriotism that contrib-
utes to enhance approval rates (Carlin et al., 2012; Gronke 
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& Newman, 2003). Some of these key factors may contrib-
ute to understand Uribe’s approval, in particular econom-
ic evaluations. However, the other two face limitations, as 
time didn’t affect negatively Uribe’s approval scores and 
Colombia faced an internal crisis rather than an external 
one. Thus, explaining Uribes’ approval needs to go beyond 
the traditional divers of presidential approval.
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Following the comparative literature on presidential ap-
proval and some particularities of the Colombian case, we 
argue that the exceptionally high approval rates that he 
enjoyed during his presidential tenure were the result of 
the interplay of three factors. First, Uribe developed a rul-
ing style that allowed him to build an affective link with 
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citizens (Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez, 2014). Second, he 
managed to create a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere, 
more typical of international crises, regarding the inter-
nal armed conflict. By priming his counterinsurgent strat-
egy and its positive results, he convinced Colombians of 
the threat posed by guerrillas, of their imminent military 
defeat, and of the patriotism needed for such endeavor. 
Finally, during the Uribe years the Colombian economy 
boomed.
To test our argument, we use both aggregate and indi-
vidual level data. Using a cross-national dataset we compare 
26 Latin American presidents to study how government 
style and macroeconomic fluctuations are related to ap-
proval averages. Using individual-level survey data we 
compare the rally effects and the impact of economic per-
ceptions on job approval for presidents Uribe and Santos, 
while controlling for other factors. Results from our analy-
ses indicate that, compared to other presidents in the re-
gion, Uribe exhibited high approval ratings because he 
was part of a group of Latin American executives who de-
veloped a government style based on an emotional link 
with people and enjoyed positive macroeconomic indica-
tors. Our results also show that those citizens who saw the 
internal conflict as the main problem in Colombia and were 
more exposed to media news were more likely to support 
Álvaro Uribe. Positive economic perceptions are also cor-
related with Uribe’s approval. Finally, our results indicate 
that beyond the government style, a permanent rally ef-
fect, and the economy, Uribe’s outstanding popular support 
may be associated with his ability to build a loyal base of 
supporters.
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section pres-
ents a brief balance of the literature on presidential approv-
al. The second section scrutinizes Álvaro Uribe’s popularity. 
The third section describes our data and analytical frame-
work. The fourth section presents a detailed description of 
our results. The final section concludes.
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Situating Uribe within the presidential approval  
literature
Presidential approval has been explained taking into con-
sideration a myriad of factors, time being the first of them. 
Several studies starting with the work of Mueller (1973) 
have demonstrated that after an initial phase of high ap-
proval ratings, popularity tends to decline as the presiden-
tial term elapses. This phenomenon known as the honey-
moon effect suggests that presidents, once in office, suffer 
a wear out process that contributes to a decline in their ap-
proval. High approval ratings tend to last about six months 
(Erikson, Mackuen, & Stimson, 2002).Other studies propose 
that presidential approval ratings follow a cyclical trajec-
tory over time: After the honeymoon period, approval num-
bers start to decline, reaching their lowest point by midway 
through the presidential term, then by the time elections 
approach approval rates rise again (Anderson 1996). There 
is also evidence that under particular circumstances there 
is an “anti-honeymoon” effect or a permanent honeymoon. 
When George W. Bush came into power in the midst of a 
controversy around his election, throughout the first months 
of his presidency, his approval numbers were lower than 
during the second semester of the first year (Eichenberg, 
Stoll, and Lebo, 2006). In rare cases, however, presidents 
have sustained high approval ratings over their entire ad-
ministrations; Álvaro Uribe is a good example of this situa-
tion (García-Sánchez & Wills, 2011).
A second line of research belongs to the economic vot-
ing literature (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; MacKuen, Erikson, 
& Stimson, 1992). Here, the basic intuition states that when 
the economy faces a crisis or when citizens have a neg-
ative perception of the national economy, presidential ap-
proval faces a reduction. Although there is evidence that 
this relationship holds in several countries (Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2009), recent research showed that such link is 
conditioned by various factors. Specifically, citizens tend to 
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hold their presidents accountable for the economy in coun-
tries in which the executive is the actor “responsible” of 
such matters (Powell Jr and Whitten, 1993). Variations in 
responsibility are linked to the institutional structure of a 
country (Nadeau, Niemi, &Yoshinaka, 2002), the balance of 
power between the president and the legislature (unified 
government versus divided government) (Anderson, 2000, 
2007), and the effective control governments exercise over 
economic matters in a globalized market (Hellwig & Sam-
uels, 2007; Alcañiz & Hellwig, 2011). Recent research has 
demonstrated that presidential approval in Latin America is 
affected by the economy in ways that are similar to those in 
other regions (Gélineau & Singer, 2015).
Close to the voting behavior literature, various stud-
ies showed that citizens politically identified with the rul-
ing party would be prone to have a positive evaluation of 
the executive’s performance (Campbell et al., 1960; Fiori-
na, 2002). As in the case of economic factors, the impact of 
party identification on job approval is conditioned by other 
variables such as ideological polarization and level of edu-
cation (Holmberg, 1994; Bartels, 2000). In contexts of high 
polarization, the impact of partisanship on approval will be 
stronger than in situations lacking deep ideological divi-
sions. 
Beyond evaluations of the economy and partisanship, 
presidential approval is also sensitive to foreign policy cri-
ses and international conflicts. These events may trigger 
a so-called “rally-round-the-flag” effect: a boost in pres-
idential approval ratings due to a peak in patriotism pro-
duced by a perception of an external threat (Mueller, 1973). 
The occurrence of recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the 
United States also triggered a rally effect like that observed 
in cases of military or diplomatic crisis (Eichenberg, Stoll, & 
Lebo, 2006). Similarly, security threats posed by local in-
surgents have also an effect on presidential approval (Arce, 
2003). Like other variables affecting approval ratings, the 
effect of security threats (foreign and domestic) on presi-
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dential approval is not homogeneous. Thus, violent events 
tend to have a positive effect on approval ratings for right 
leaning executives and a negative impact for leftist govern-
ments (Arce, 2003). Additionally, institutional contexts con-
dition the effect of domestic security crisis on approval rat-
ings. In fact, when there are few veto players and there is a 
unified government (high clarity of responsibility), terrorist 
attacks produce a rally effect (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-Gal-
lardo, 2015).
Along with traditional factors explaining presidential 
approval, some scholars have studied the role of a presi-
dent’s personality and government style. The basic as-
sumption of these studies is that citizens’ opinions about 
political leaders cannot be isolated from the stereotype of a 
good leader. If citizens perceive that the executive has the 
qualities of an ideal leader, it is more likely for them to ap-
prove his job. Some of those qualities are leadership, cha-
risma, knowledge, religiosity or high moral standards (Al-
drich, Gronke, & Grynaviski, 1999; Merolla & Zechmeister, 
2009). Indeed, perceptions of a president’s personality 
may be so important that in certain cases citizens will for-
give the leader’s mistakes if he or she is a charismatic po-
litical figure (Sullivan et al., 1990; Merolla and Zechmeis-
ter, 2009). Ronald Reagan’s charisma, for instance, appears 
to have helped him overcome political difficulties without 
affecting his approval ratings (Sullivan et al., 1990; Funk, 
1996; Lyons, 1997). Government style, closely linked to 
leaders’ personalities, also explains variations in presiden-
tial approval. Presidents who develop a government style 
relying on their personalities and a close link with the peo-
ple tend to have high approval ratings (Ortiz-Ayala & Gar-
cía-Sánchez, 2014). Hence Latin American presidents like 
Hugo Chávez and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva may have en-
joyed high levels of job approval thanks to their ability to 
develop a government style close to citizens.
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Explaining an outlier
In this paper, we argue that the exceptionally high ap-
proval rates that Uribe enjoyed during his presidency are 
a consequence of the interplay of three factors. First, Uribe 
developed a ruling style that allowed him to build an af-
fective link with citizens (Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez, 
2014). Second, he managed to create a rally-around-the-
flag atmosphere regarding the situation of armed conflict. 
By priming his counterinsurgent strategy and its positive 
results, he convinced Colombians of the threat posed by 
guerrillas and that he was the most capable individual (if 
not the only one) to defeat them. Finally, Colombia’s eco-
nomic performance under Uribe’s administration was very 
positive.
The first element behind Uribe’s high approval numbers 
is his governing style. Here we follow the argument pre-
sented by Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez (2014) according 
to which presidents who manage to develop a personalis-
tic government style enjoy higher job approval rates than 
those executives lacking this form of ruling. A personalis-
tic style is a political strategy that attempts to build a direct 
relationship between the president and its citizens that re-
lies on an emotional link. In order to do that personalistic 
leaders use their charisma, elements of the popular culture 
and a political discourse that present themselves as saviors 
of the nation. By building an emotional link with people, 
these presidents manage to increase trust in the executive, 
which translates into high approval ratings (Ortiz & García-
Sánchez, 2014: 377).
Álvaro Uribe is a clear example of a personalistic leader. 
He was a charismatic president in the Weberian sense of 
the word, as people saw him as an individual with excep-
tional abilities (Weber, 1977). Uribe worked long hours, ap-
peared before the public as a disciplined and strict person, 
forced his subordinates to deliver results, and exhibited a 
very combative personality picking up fights with all his 
contradictors. Uribe complemented his charismatic leader-
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ship with an ability to connect with popular culture. Despite 
the fact that he came from a very rich family and that his 
government championed the interests of economic elites, 
the president dressed, talked, acted, and prayed as a hum-
ble peasant. This performance helped him to connect with 
thousands of men and women who shared his traditional 
world view (Bonilla, 2015). On top of that, Uribe stressed his 
regional origin so he distinguished himself from the Bogotá 
elites. These characteristics distanced Uribe from other Co-
lombian presidents who were not able or were unwilling to 
establish an emotional connection with the public. For in-
stance, Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’ successor, lacked cha-
risma and his efforts to connect with the public were un-
successful, because they did not appear to be authentic. He, 
as most recent Colombian presidents, was seen as another 
representative of the traditional elites from the capital.5
Finally, Uribe presented himself as a crusader against 
the enemies of the patria (fatherland). These enemies not 
only included the leftist guerrillas –severely debilitat-
ed during his administration–, but also the opposition, the 
media, the Courts and Hugo Chávez (Sierra, 2015).In sum, 
we expect presidents, like Álvaro Uribe, characterized by a 
personalistic governing style, to enjoy higher levels of ap-
proval than those executives who do not establish such a 
governing style.
The second pillar of Uribe’s high approval ratings regards 
his ability to create a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere 
about the internal conflict that lasted throughout his tenure. 
By 2002, the year in which Uribe took office,security was 
a serious national concern. After years of increasing politi-
cal violence –produced both by leftist guerrillas and right-
wing paramilitaries–, a surge in the number of kidnappings 
and a failed peace process between the FARC and the Pas-
trana administration (1998-2002), Colombians felt hopeless. 
5 The affective government style index, presented in Figure 2, illustrates the 
contrast between Uribe and Santos. The former ranks at the top of this index, 
while the latter ranks at the bottom. 
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Just months after his inauguration Álvaro Uribe launched a 
security strategy that started to produce results such as the 
demobilization of the paramilitary bands and the weaken-
ing of the leftist guerrillas. Despite the improvements in se-
curity and a positive public mood, the president constantly 
reminded the public that the threats to the nation (la patria) 
were alive (“the snake is alive”, he said). The menaces to 
Colombia included the communist insurgents, which he de-
scribed as “narco-terrorists” and “bloodthirsty bandits”, but 
also the opposition, human rights advocates, and even the 
Supreme Court. Those who dared to criticize the president 
were stigmatized as “terrorist in civilian clothes”, “prophets 
of disaster” or simply “enemies of the fatherland”. In contrast, 
he presented himself as the “first soldier of the nation”, the 
leader of a crusade to save the country.
Two mechanisms helped Uribe prime his message and 
frame reality to his favor. The first was a well-crafted com-
munications strategy that consisted of producing daily press 
releases that were distributed through a network of small 
and medium radio and TV stations, avoiding interviews 
with newspapers to elude editing, and being the first to 
talk to the country in moments of crisis (Sierra, 2015). Sec-
ond, the president had weekly meetings with local commu-
nities (consejos comunales de gobierno) in different places 
of the country. In those gatherings, he reinforced people’s 
feeling of having a close and capable president and contin-
ued distributing his simple and persuasive message about 
the threats faced by Colombia.  In short, Uribe set the public 
agenda for eight years.
We argue that Uribe’s sustained message stressing the 
insurgent threat and the effectiveness of the government’s 
security strategy resulted in citizens forming their opinions 
about the president relying on the issues emphasized by his 
message (Druckman, 2004). Therefore, we expect that sup-
port for Uribe will be significantly higher among those in-
dividuals who saw insurgency as the main problem of the 
country and among those who were more exposed to mass 
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media (García-Sánchez & Wills, 2011). In addition, we be-
lieve that for those who saw guerrillas as the country’s 
most important problem, support for Uribe should be higher 
as media consumption increases.
The third element that helped Uribe sustain high lev-
els of approval was a growing economy. After facing a cri-
sis in 1999, the Colombian economy started to experience 
a slow recovery that accelerated during Álvaro Uribe’s 
first term. From 2002 to 2007, Colombia’s GDP grew over 
5 percent, reaching its peak in 2007 when the economy 
grew 7.5 percent. Such positive numbers were attributed 
to measures taken by the administration (reduction in gov-
ernment spending and a reform of the retirement system, 
among others) and to an increase in foreign investment 
that poured into the country thanks to the improving se-
curity conditions (Botero & Méndez, 2008; Rettberg, 2010). 
Although the 2008 global crisis affected Colombian econo-
my, the blow was not as strong as that experienced by oth-
er countries (there was a small but positive GDP growth in 
2008 and 2009). The economy also benefitted from a surge 
in the prices of oil and coal –key Colombian exports– that 
granted Uribe’s administration additional resources. In fact, 
in the midst of the 2008 crisis, the Colombian economy was 
driven by extractive activities (Rettberg, 2009). Thus, fol-
lowing the logic of the economic voting literature we expect 
fluctuations of presidential approval to relate to fluctuations 
in the economy. Due to the distance between objective eco-
nomic indicators and perceptions of the economy, at the in-
dividual level we expect a positive relationship between 
evaluations of the national economy and Uribe’s approval.
Data and methods
To test the hypotheses relating executive approval to presi-
dents’ style of government, we make use of aggregate data. 
The data set includes 26 Latin American presidents from 16 
countries who held office between 1999 and 2016, amount-
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ing to 629 data points (president-quarters).The dependent 
variable is a quarterly approval report for each president, 
obtained from the Executive Approval Project (EAP) (Carlin 
et al., 2016).6
The main independent variable is the measure of affec-
tive government style, an additive index introduced by Or-
tiz-Ayala and García-Sánchez (2014) which captures four 
dimensions: charisma, closeness to popular culture, a po-
larizing discourse, and direct contact with the people. Fig-
ure 2 graphs the results obtained by these authors for the 
affective government style index for each president in their 
study.7 We employ the original metrics from 0 to 6, where 
6 indicates the most affective governing style.8 Other inde-
pendent variables considered for the aggregate level anal-
ysis are: inflation, GDP growth,9 dummy variables captur-
ing the first three quarters of a president’s term and dummy 
variables indicating whether the election takes place one or 
two quarters ahead (Carlin et al., 2018).
Considering the nature of our data, to test the hypoth-
eses on the effect of government style and fluctuations of 
the economy, the most adequate strategy would be to run 
a fixed effects model. However, since the affective govern-
ment style index is a time invariant variable this is not pos-
sible. As an alternative, the first aggregate level estimation 
(Model 1) controls for the presidents’ “fixed effects” using 
dummy variables for each leader, instead of estimating the 
fixed effects by demeaning; this allow us to keep the govern-
6 The EAP collects and combines approval data from different sources for all Latin 
American countries. These scores are “smoothed” into a quarterly time series 
that is comparable across time despite of being estimated from different sourc-
es. For a more detailed description of the EAP data see: http://www.executive-
approval.org/.
7 For a more detailed description of this index see: Ortiz-Ayala and García-Sán-
chez, 2014.
8 Table 4 in the Appendix shows both the approval rate and the affective gov-
ernment style index for each president and each year for which the data are 
available.
9 Table 5 in the Appendix lists the sources for the macroeconomic data included 
in this model, by country.
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ment style index in the model. This estimation controls for 
inflation and economic growth (including one-quarter lags of 
these variables) and includes dummy variables to control for 
the honeymoon effect and the end of term popularity re-
bound. Others have also included a lagged dependent vari-
able to capture the dynamic nature of presidential approval 
(Carlin et al., 2018), and therefore we estimated a second 
model including such control. However, since the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable requires our model to meet 
stricter assumptions we rely on results from Model 1.10
Figure 2. Affective government style index
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Source: Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez, 2014.
10 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable means that we are dealing with 
a dynamic panel. The proper way to analyze this type of panels is by using 
an instrument for the lagged dependent variable and to estimate the model 
by first differences. Since our variable of interest is time invariant, we discard-
ed such strategy. Therefore, estimators from model 2 are likely to be biased 
and inconsistent as this model violates the assumption of strict exogeneity 
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term (Kennedy, 2003; 
Greene, 2012).
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We expect the coefficient for the affective government style 
index to be positive. That is, we hypothesize that a more 
personalistic ruling style results in higher approval rates. 
A better economic performance (that is, higher growth and 
lower inflation) is expected to be correlated with higher ap-
proval rates. Finally, coefficients for the dummy variables 
capturing the honeymoon effect and the end of term ap-
proval bump are expected to be positive. 
At the individual level, we use a dataset constructed by 
pooling survey data from the Colombian Americas Barome-
ter-Lapop from 2004 to 2016. This database covers the sec-
ond half of Uribe’s first term and his entire second term, 
as well as five years of Santos’ administration. Here exec-
utive’s job approval is a measure using a five-point scale 
that run from “very good” (muy bueno) to “very bad” (muy 
malo).11 The main independent variables are: a measure 
that identifies whether the respondent considers conflict to 
be the main problem of the country, political sophistication 
(as a proxy of media consumption, (Zaller, 1992), and retro-
spective sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the econo-
my (Singer & Carlin, 2013). We also include controls such as 
income, gender, age, education, perceptions of corruption 
and security, and a variable called “Uribe camp”.12
Using these data, we test the rally-around-the-flag hy-
pothesis and the impact of sociotropic and egotropic eval-
uations of the economy on presidential approval. We esti-
mate two sets of OLS models of job approval: one for Uribe 
(using survey data from 2004 to 2010) and the other for 
11 For the purpose of the analysis we reversed the variable’s code so higher 
scores capture high approval.
12 Uribe camp is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the informant 
supported Uribe or one of the presidential candidates endorsed by him. For in-
dividuals interviewed between 2006 and 2010 were coded as in Uribe’s camp 
if they voted for him in the previous presidential election (2002 and 2006). For 
the 2011 and 2013 surveys, the Uribe camp includes those who voted for San-
tos in 2010. For the 2014 and 2016 studies, the Uribe camp consists of those 
who intended to vote for Zuluaga, Uribe’s Centro Democrático party. The 2013 
survey was excluded from the analysis because the question on previous vote 
choice was not included in that year (Matanock & García-Sánchez, 2017)
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Santos (using data from 2011 to 2016). By doing this we can 
observe the effects of the main independent variables and 
compare whether they work differently for Uribe compared 
to Santos. For each president we estimate four models: 
Model 1 includes all independent variables but the inter-
active term (conflict main problem x sophistication); Mod-
el 2 ads the interactive term; Model 3 excludes the variable 
“Uribe camp” and the interactive term; Model 4 ads the in-
teractive term to Model 3. There may be a possible endo-
geneity between Uribe Camp and the dependent variable; 
however, we think that is very unlikely as Uribe Camp cap-
tures a relatively stable divide in Colombian politics, as po-
litical identities broke into two clear factions during Uribe’s 
presidency and specially when Uribe distanced himself 
from Santos once the latter started peace negotiations with 
the FARC in 2012. Uribe camp proved to be a strong pre-
dictor of different political attitudes (Matanock & García-
Sánchez, 2017). As this political divide is still driving public 
opinion in Colombia we decided to estimate various mod-
els including this variable, despite the possible endogene-
ity; similarly, we estimate a set of models excluding “Uribe 
camp” to test how robustly our models behave without such 
a strong predictor.
Since we argue that the rally effect was channeled 
through Uribe’s capacity to constantly prime a message 
about his security policies, we expect those individuals who 
think the internal conflict is the main problem of Colombia 
to have a higher level of support for Uribe. This is because 
they formed their opinion about the president’s performance 
relying on the issue most emphasized by the executive him-
self (Druckman, 2004). Since we use sophistication as a 
measure of media consumption, there should be a positive 
relationship between it and presidential approval, as me-
dia consumers were more likely to be exposed to Uribe’s 
message.We also include an interaction term between con-
flict as the main problem of the country and sophistication. 
The effect of thinking that the conflict is the most serious 
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problem is expected to be stronger among those individuals 
who are more exposed to media news. The impact of the 
two variables capturing the rally effect must be significant 
only in the models for the Uribe administration. President 
Santos did not produce a rally effect. 
The sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the econo-
my must have positive effects on approval, as previous re-
search has shown for the Colombian case (García-Sánchez 
and Wills, 2011). Our individual level models also include a 
set of dummy variables capturing the year and a variable 
measuring how many months in office the president has 
served at the time of the survey. These variables, specially 
the second one, allow us to deal with the confounding hon-
eymoon effects. Finally, our individual level models include 
the set of controls mentioned above.
Results
In this section we present the main findings of two sets of 
statistical analyses we performed to test the effect of the 
different components of our theory about Uribe’s extraor-
dinary high popularity. We start with the aggregate-level 
analysis and then discuss the outcomes from the individual 
level models. The first set of analyses tests the personalis-
tic hypothesis and the effects of macroeconomic factors on 
annual approval averages. The second set of analyses tests 
the impact of Uribe’s communication strategy (rally effect) 
and the role of perceptions of the national economy on in-
dividual-level evaluations of Uribe’s job performance.
Government style and economic context
The results obtained from the aggregate-level comparative 
model (see Table 1) suggest a positive and significant effect 
of a president’s ruling style on how citizens form their opin-
ions about the executive. Presidents who develop personal-
istic, emotional links with the population are rewarded by 
higher approval ratings. All else equal, the predicted differ-
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ence in approval between the least personalistic president 
and the most personalistic one is about12 points based on 
Model 1 returns.
Table 1. Regression results for executive approval - Aggregate, 
comparative Level
Variables M1 M2 (Dynamic panel)
Approval t-1 0.846**
(0.0390)
Affective Index 2.697** 0.539**
(0.147) (0.108)
Honeymoon 1st Quarter 4.081+ 1.460*
(1.994) (0.697)
Honeymoon 2nd Quarter 6.541** 0.752
(1.583) (1.192)
Honeymoon 3rd Quarter 4.949** -0.0170
(1.412) (0.949)
1 Quarter pre-election 1.047 1.016
(2.223) (0.791)
2 Quarter pre-election 0.618 1.271
(1.864) (1.125)
Inflation -0.573* -0.507**
(0.224) (0.175)
Growth 8.099 7.380
(9.979) (4.871)
Inflation t-1 -0.171 0.385*
(0.244) (0.150)
Growth t-1 12.15 -0.120
(13.28) (5.444)
Presidents’ dummies YES YES
Constant 56.84** 8.211**
(1.140) (2.173)
Observations 581 581
R-squared 0.678 0.897
Number of presidents 16 16
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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The comparative perspective adopted in this model 
helps explain why Uribe is such an outlier in the distribu-
tion of approval rates among Latin American presidents. As 
we develop in more detail below, he was able to relate to 
the people using his charisma, to adopt a mimetic approach 
to the common citizen, and to rally support around him to 
face his foes, which he made the nation’s. Even now, eight 
years after he left office, many people feel strongly emo-
tional ties with his persona. The model shows how his per-
sonalistic style of ruling, the highest among the presidents 
included in the study developed by Ortiz-Ayala and García-
Sánchez (2014),13 is correlated to his exceptionally high ap-
proval rates.
Among the economic factors included in the model, only 
the inflation rate reaches statistical significance in the ex-
pected direction. Ceteris paribus, an additional percentage 
point in a country’s inflation rate entails a decline of almost 
0.6 percentage points in its president’s approval rate. Mod-
el 1 also indicates that presidents tend to be more popular 
during the first three quarters of their terms, than in the rest 
of their tenure. Finally, our analysis didn’t offer evidence of 
an approval boost during the two quarters prior to the gen-
eral election.
Rally-around-the-flag and economic voting
Results presented in Table 2 make it clear that some of the 
factors behind Álvaro Uribe’s job approval are exclusive to 
this president. Although citizens’ support for Uribe and San-
tos are positively correlated with sociotropic and egotropic 
evaluations of the economy and with perceptions of secu-
rity, as expected; support for Uribe is also correlated with 
considering insurgency as the main problem of Colombia 
and with respondents’ sophistication (our proxy for media 
consumption). These two factors are not associated with 
Santos’ job approval. 
13 See Figure 2.
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Thus, among those who think conflict with insurgents 
was the main problem of the country there was a signifi-
cantly higher level of approval for Uribe, compared to those 
citizens seeing other issues as the most relevant problem. 
This result offers evidence that Uribe’s capacity to create 
a rally-around-the-flag atmosphere about the internal con-
flict had an impact on his popularity, as those citizens con-
vinced that the insurgency posed a threat to the country, a 
message constantly primed by the president, formed their 
opinions about him relying on such issue. We also found 
that sophistication, a proxy for media consumption, was 
positively correlated with approval for Uribe (in 2 out of 4 
specifications). This, to some extent, indicates that media 
consumers may have been exposed to Uribe’s achievements 
and to a persuasive message stressing the dangers posed 
by insurgents and that the only leader capable of defeating 
those evils was Uribe.
Results from the interaction term between conflict with 
guerrillas as the main problem of the country and sophis-
tication give us a more detailed account of how the ral-
ly effect worked. Table 3 shows the linear combination of 
the relevant coefficients obtained in regression models 3 
and 4, specifically it presents the coefficient for the vari-
able conflict as the main problem for the minimum and the 
maximum levels of sophistication.14 The effect of consider-
ing conflict as the main problem of the country was only 
significant for those persons with the highest level of so-
phistication (media consumption). This indicates that be-
ing concerned about the internal conflict was not enough 
for approving Uribe’s job, this concern turned into a sig-
nificant determinant of supporting the president when citi-
zens were more exposed to Uribe’s communication strategy. 
14 Since the interpretation of interactive terms is not straightforward, we present 
the additive combination of the coefficient for the variable of interest and the 
interaction coefficient for the different values of the second variable included 
in the interaction (sophistication). For a more detailed discussion on the inter-
pretation of interactions see (Franzese & Kam, 2009).
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Thus, as the president constantly primed citizens, through 
different media channels (radio, TV news, and televised 
Consejos Comunales de Gobierno), about his security strat-
egy and the risk posed by guerrillas, Uribe turned thou-
sands of frequent media consumers, concerned about inter-
nal conflict, into his supporters.
The variable Uribe Camp predicted a tremendous and 
significant increase in Uribe’s presidential approval and a 
significant reduction (not as large) in approval for Santos. 
For those within this political faction, support for Uribe was 
about 23 points higher than for citizens located in other po-
litical camps. This indicates that Uribe’s exceptional high 
levels of support during his presidency may have also been 
the product of his capacity to build a base of loyal support-
ers and to polarize the electorate vis-à-vis approaches to 
internal conflict. In Colombia, Uribismo and anti-Uribismo 
grew up as strong political attachments capable of model-
ing opinions and defining electoral results. In 2014 Oscar 
Iván Zuluaga, the obscure candidate supported by Uribe, 
defeated the incumbent in the first round of the presidential 
election. Four years later in 2018, Uribe’s blessing to Iván 
Duque’s candidacy turned an unknown senator into the 
winner of the presidential bid.
Other results from our models deserve mention. There 
is no significant relationship between wealth and approv-
al for Uribe’s job. This suggests that Uribe’s support base 
was widespread across social classes. In the case of Santos 
an increase in wealth predicts a reduction of support, indi-
cating a narrower support base. Perceptions of corruption 
affect more clearly Santos’s approval than Uribe’s. Support 
for Santos decreased as the perceptions of corruption in-
creased. Although both governments were affected by cor-
ruption scandals, most events affecting Uribe’s administra-
tion were public after he left office. And while and in recent 
years Colombia witnessed a political context of increasing 
corruption scandals, however not all of them implicated the 
government.
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Table 2. Regression models for support for Uribe and for Santos. 
Individual level data
Uribe Santos
VARIABLES M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Sociotropic evaluation - 
retrospective
0.117** 0.117** 0.162** 0.162** 0.114** 0.114** 0.131** 0.132**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Egotropic evaluation - 
retrospective
0.029** 0.029** 0.055** 0.055** 0.028+ 0.028+ 0.035** 0.035**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Uribe camp 23.620** 23.630** -3.579** -3.575**
(0.904) (0.905) (1.156) (1.156)
Education -0.118 -0.118 -0.387** -0.382** -0.007 -0.006 0.042 0.041
(0.106) (0.106) (0.091) (0.091) (0.150) (0.150) (0.090) (0.090)
Age 0.003 0.004 0.053* 0.053* 0.060 0.060 0.125** 0.125**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022)
Gender (female) -0.562 -0.561 1.067+ 1.040+ 0.323 0.330 -0.235 -0.242
(0.752) (0.752) (0.629) (0.629) (1.072) (1.073) (0.623) (0.623)
Wealth 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.073** -0.073** -0.059** -0.058**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)
Perception of corruption -0.006 -0.006 -0.023+ -0.022+ -0.093** -0.094** -0.081** -0.081**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Perception of security 1.475+ 1.478+ 2.077** 2.067** 3.730** 3.733** 1.721** 1.723**
(0.768) (0.769) (0.635) (0.635) (1.081) (1.081) (0.625) (0.625)
Conflict as main pro-
blem
2.374** 2.670+ 3.960** 1.750 0.303 0.891 1.929** 0.700
(0.787) (1.591) (0.655) (1.269) (1.153) (2.694) (0.713) (1.501)
Sophistication 2.250* 2.423+ 1.065 -0.231 0.611 0.815 -0.536 -0.966
(0.961) (1.256) (0.778) (1.005) (1.471) (1.696) (0.825) (0.946)
Conflict x sophistication -0.385 2.944* -0.718 1.580
(1.799) (1.448) (2.971) (1.698)
Months in office -1.204** -1.200** -2.023** -2.048** -0.308** -0.308** - -0.339**
(0.395) (0.395) (0.325) (0.325) (0.038) (0.038) (0.025)
2007 -44.947** -44.821** -72.776** -73.650**
(13.706) (13.721) (11.243) (11.248)
2008 -34.370** -34.262** -57.844** -58.580**
(11.361) (11.374) (9.315) (9.320)
2009 -10.843* -10.802* -17.964** -18.221**
(4.281) (4.286) (3.500) (3.501)
2010 - - - -
2012 0.635 0.629 -2.014* 1.386
(1.221) (1.222) (1.013) (0.923)
2013 -13.267** -4.093**
(0.845) (0.713)
2014 - - -11.536** -
(0.841)
Constant 96.528** 96.230** 147.622** 149.684** 71.150** 71.007** 60.174** 63.564**
(18.355) (18.411) (14.952) (14.982) (3.560) (3.609) (1.887) (2.004)
N 2,834 2,834 5,114 5,114 1,443 1,443 4,460 4,460
R-squared 0.297 0.297 0.115 0.116 0.131 0.131 0.164 0.165
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Table 3. Interaction results. Conflict as the main problem  
of Colombia for different values of sophistication
Sophistication 
level (media 
consumption)
Coefficient Standard 
Error
P
Conflict as main problem 
(W / Uribe camp)
Low 2.670 1.591 0.093
High 2.284 0.891 0.010
Conflict as main problem 
(W out / Uribe camp)
Low 1.750 1.269 0.168
High 4.694 0.748 0.000
Conclusions
In this paper we offered evidence that Álvaro Uribe’s high 
popularity is correlated with factors traditionally used to 
explain presidential approval, but also with factors specific 
to the Colombian case and to Uribe’s political strategy.
Our comparative analysis also showed that personalistic 
presidents –those that use their charisma, elements of the 
popular culture and a political discourse presenting them-
selves as saviors of the nation–, build an emotional link 
with people that ends up having a positive effect on their 
approval scores. Uribe tops the list of Latin American presi-
dents, including figures like Chávez, Lula, Correa and José 
Mujica, that thanks to this personalistic government style 
enjoyed high approval scores. 
Our analysis also offers evidence that Uribe’s high pop-
ularity was also linked to certain particularities of his gov-
ernment. Specifically, to his diagnosis of Colombia’s prob-
lems, strategy to face such challenges, and communication 
strategy. In a country facing multiple forms of violence, 
Uribe convinced the public that the left-wing guerrillas 
were the main threat to the country, that his counterinsur-
gency strategy was the proper way to defeat them, and that 
he was the right leader to conduct such endeavor. This cre-
ated a permanent rally-around-the-flag atmosphere about 
the internal conflict that lasted his entire tenure. A well-
crafted communications strategy helped to sustain the ral-
ly effect. Our data showed that citizens who believed con-
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flict with insurgents was the main problem of the country 
and those more exposed to media exhibited the highest 
approval scores for Uribe. They received and accepted the 
message primed by the president and formed their opin-
ions about Uribe based on the issue that articulated such a 
message. However, being concerned about internal conflict 
was apparently not enough to engender approval of Uribe’s 
job performance. Rather, this concern turned into a signifi-
cant determinant of supporting the president when citizens 
were exposed to his communication strategy. These factors 
did not explain Santos’s job approval.
On top of these factors, like other studies on presidential 
approval, we found a link between the economy and our 
dependent variable. Álvaro Uribe enjoyed positive econom-
ic conditions and took certain actions to promote growth, 
control inflation and increase foreign investments; this pos-
itively affected his approval scores. Our comparative anal-
ysis showed that in Latin America approval averages are 
sensitive to inflation but not to economic growth; this re-
veals the importance of the economy in a region that has 
experienced economic crisis and important variations in in-
flation. In the case of Uribe, his capacity to maintain infla-
tion slightly under the regional mean may have contributed 
to sustain his popularity.15At the individual level, we found 
a positive relationship between perceptions of the nation-
al and personal economies and presidential approval.  Al-
though these relationships are almost constant in all ap-
proval models in Latin America, its contribution to sustain 
presidential popularity may change from country to coun-
try due to variations in the volume of individuals with posi-
tive evaluations of the economy. Thus, the fact that during 
the Uribe years the public mood around the economy was 
positive and about a quarter of the country said that the na-
tional economy was improving indicate that economic vari-
15 Colombia’s average inflation from 2002 to 2010 was 5.4%. The regional mean 
for the same period was 6.2%. 
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ables may have played an important role sustaining Uribe’s 
popularity. In other words, even though in both Uribe and 
Santos’ popularity models the economy was positively cor-
related with the dependent variable, the volume of citizens 
that considered the economy to be in better shape than the 
previous year was higher during Uribe’s second term (23%) 
than during the two Santos’ administrations (13%).
Beyond these three factors, our analysis indicates that 
Uribe may have enjoyed a permanent honeymoon with 
the public by turning sympathizers into militants. Over the 
last 20 years Colombian political parties weakened and 
citizens’ distrust in these institutions increased; paradoxi-
cally, at the same time Uribismo evolved into a political 
force capable of mobilizing thousands of loyal followers. 
Although this may be an effect of Uribe’s high popularity, 
we think that once he transformed his sympathizers into 
militants, he was able to sustain high approval scores; his 
continued popularity to the present augurs in favor of this 
interpretation.
Finally, our study suggests that understanding presiden-
tial approval is an endeavor that needs to go beyond tra-
ditional factors and methods. Deep knowledge of national 
contexts and the political strategies of executives beyond 
the U.S. context will, we believe, lead to significant theo-
retical breakthroughs. Although most presidents’ approval 
scores behave in a similar fashion and the variation of such 
numbers can be explained relying on variables such as the 
economy, partisanship and time, in many cases presiden-
tial approval moves in a puzzling manner. Identifying the 
factors that can explain such outliers requires detailed case 
knowledge of both the political system and the incumbent.
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Table 5 Sources of macroeconomic data
Country GDP growth Inflation
Argentina World Bank World Bank
Bolivia World Bank Banco Central de Bolivia
Brazil World Bank World Bank
Chile World Bank World Bank
Colombia World Bank Banco de la República
Costa Rica World Bank World Bank
Ecuador World Bank World Bank
El Salvador World Bank World Bank
Guatemala World Bank World Bank
Mexico World Bank World Bank
Nicaragua World Bank Banco Central de Nicaragua
Panama World Bank World Bank
Paraguay World Bank World Bank
Peru World Bank World Bank
Uruguay World Bank World Bank
Venezuela Fred Fred
Description of variables / Individual level model
Retrospective sociotropic evaluation of the economy. This 
variable captures respondents’ opinion on the past situa-
tion of the national economy. It is based on the following 
question: Do you think that the country’s current economic 
situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 
months ago? Individuals had 3 response options in which 1 
was “better”, 2 was “the same” and 3 was “worst”.
Retrospective evaluation of the personal economy. This 
variable captures respondents’ opinion on the past situa-
tion of his personal economy. It is based on the following 
question: Do you think that your economic situation is bet-
ter than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? 
Individuals had 3 response options in which 1 was “better”, 
2 was “the same” and 3 was “worst”.
Uribe Camp.This variable is a dichotomous indicator that 
takes the value of one for Uribe supporters and zero other-
wise.This variable was created using vote choice reports for 
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the previous presidential election. Individuals interviewed 
between 2006 and 2010 were coded as in his camp if they 
voted for Uribe in the previous presidential election (2002 
and 2006). For the 2011 and 2013 surveys, the Uribe camp 
consists of those who voted for Santos in 2010. For the 2014 
and 2016 studies, the Uribe camp consists of those who in-
tended to vote for Óscar Iván Zuluaga. The 2013 survey was 
excluded from the analysis because the question on previ-
ous vote choice was not included in that year.
Education. This variable measures each respondent’s 
years of formal education. 
Age. This variable was measured as the respondent’s 
number of years.
Gender. This is a dummy variable coded 1 if male, and 0 
if female. 
Wealth. This is an index of individuals’ ownership of 
nine consumption goods. These goods are: television, re-
frigerator, conventional telephone, cellular telephone, auto-
mobile, washing machine, microwave, indoor running wa-
ter, indoor bathroom, and personal computer. This index is 
measured on a 0 to 100 scale.
Perception of corruption.This variable captures respond- 
ents’ perception of corruption among public servants. It is 
based on the following question: Based on your experience 
the corruption of public servants is: 1. Very widespread, 
2. Somewhat widespread, 3. Not very widespread, 4. Not 
widespread.
Perception of security. This variable measures respond- 
ents’ perception of neighborhood security. It is captured us-
ing the following question: Speaking of the neighborhood 
where you live and thinking of the possibility of being as-
saulted or robbed, do you feel 1. Very safe, 2. Somewhat 
safe, 3. Somewhat unsafe or 4. Very unsafe?
Conflict as main problem. This variable is a dichotomous 
indicator that takes the value of one for those respondents 
that consider armed conflict to be the main problem faced 
by the country. All other responses have the value of zero. 
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This variable was created using the following open-ended 
question: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem 
faced by the country?
Media consumption. This variable measures frequency 
of media consumption using this question: About how often 
do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, 
newspapers or the internet? The alternatives are: 1. Daily, 
2. A few times a week, 3. A few times a month, 4. Rarely. 5 
Never.
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